

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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O P 201110Z JUL 74

FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN

TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 1356

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO EGYPT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY

AMEMBASSY LONDON UK PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN PRIORITY

COMIDEASTFOR

S E C R E T MANAMA 0527

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS : MARR, PFOR, US, BA

SUBJECT : RETAINING MIDDLE EAST FORCE IN BAHRAIN

REF : MANAMA 525

1. SEEING AMIR OFF AT AIRPORT THIS MORNING DEVELOPMENT MINISTER SHIRAWI ASKED ME IF I HAD BEEN GIVEN THE DECISION ON THE NAVY. WHEN I SAID NOT YET HE MOVED AWAY IN SOME CONFUSION. SUBSEQUENTLY I TOOK FOREIGN SERVICE INSPECTORS TO CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER AND THEN SHIRAWI. FOREIGN MINISTER, CLEARLY IMPLYING HE WAS REFERRING TO NAVY QUESTION, SAID HE WOULD CALL ME IN A "DAY OR TWO". THEN SHIRAWI TOLD INSPECTORS GOB WOULD BE DECIDING MID-EASTFOR ISSUE IN NEXT DAY OR TWO. (COMMENT: WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE HAPPENED IS THAT AMIR LEFT INSTRUCTIONS WITH CABINET TO MAKE FORMAL DECISION IN FAVOR OF US NAVY'S REMAINING SUBJECT TO RESOLVING THOSE PROBLEMS (INCLUDING JURISDICTION, RENT, AND HOW TO FINESSE TERMINATION NOTICE) WHICH ARE OF CONCERN TO GOB. ALTHOUGH CABINET IS SCHEDULED TO MEET JULY 20, IT MAY TAKE GOB SEVERAL DAYS TO WORK OUT ITS BARGAINING POSITION.)

2. SHIRAWI TOOK OCCASION OF BRIEFING INSPECTORS TO GIVE A PEEP

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SHOW OF GOB POSITION. IN ADDITION TO QUESTION OF JURISDICTION

HE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN RENT WILL BE EXPECTED.

3. SHIRAWI THEN WENT ON TO POINT OUT, WHILE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NAVY'S USE OF FACILITIES SHOULD BE SELF CONTAINED IN COMMERCIAL RENTAL PACKAGE, GOB DECISION FOR BAHRAIN TO REMAIN HOME PORT FOR US NAVY OBVIOUSLY CREATES A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN US AND BAHRAIN. IN RECOGNITION OF THIS, IT IS IMPORTANT USG MAKE SOME SIGNIFICANT ONGOING GESTURE OF FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT, SPECIFICALLY IN TERMS OF PROVIDING AMERICAN TECHNICAL ADVISORS ON A CONCESSIONAL BASIS. HE STRESSED THAT THIS SHOULD BE A "SECURE" ARRANGEMENT NOT SUBJECT TO VICISSITUDES OF POLITICAL CHANGES OR US BUDGETARY SLASHES. WHAT HE IS LOOKING FOR IS ASSURANCE THAT USG WILL RECRUIT, PROVIDE, AND STAND BEHIND PERFORMANCE OF SMALL NUMBER OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS WHICH GOB WOULD REQUEST FROM TIME TO TIME, WITH GOB MAKING AT LEAST A TOKEN CONTRIBUTION TO COST BUT USG PICKING UP MOST OF THE TAB FOR THEIR SERVICES.

4. COMMENT: BELIEVE OUR MEETING REQUEST FOR SOME SORT OF ARRANGEMENT SUCH AS SHIRAWI SKETCHED, ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT NOT, AND PROPERLY SHOULD NOT, BE TIED DIRECTLY TO CONTINUATION MIDEASTFOR, WILL BE IN FACT A CONDITION FOR NAVY'S REMAINING HERE. DOUBT GOB THINKING ON DETAILS HAS CRYSTALIZED BUT SUSPECT THEY MAY BE LOOKING FOR SOME SORT OF FORMAL AGREEMENT. AMIR COMMENTED TO ME SEVERAL WEEKS AGO THAT HE NEEDS SOME VISIBLE EVIDENCE OF US CONCERN FOR BAHRAINI TECHNICAL PROGRESS "THAT I CAN SHOW MY PEOPLE WHO WONDER WHERE THE AMERICANS ARE IF THEY ARE OUR FRIENDS." I AM WELL AWARE OF STATUTORY AND BUDGETARY PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN MEETING SUCH BAHRAINI REQUEST, BUT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN ASSISTANCE POLICY TOWARD THE GULF AND WORKING OUT THE MODALITIES SHOULD NOT BE BEYOND THE INGENUITY OF MAN, IF WE INDEED WANT THE NAVY TO REMAIN.

5. DEPT PASS DOD/ISA, CNO WASHDC, CINCUSNAVEUR.  
TWINAM

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DOD

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NNN

## Message Attributes

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